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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 21 August 1990, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. ADEYEMI (Nigeria)

later: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12)

Mr. COLLINS (Ireland) said that his country had been associated with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) from the beginning of the debate in the General Assembly in 1958. Ireland had no nuclear weapons or installations for nuclear research, either civil or military, and could therefore speak out frankly on questions of nuclear proliferation. His country's support for the Treaty was unconditional.

Since the Third Review Conference in 1985, remarkable changes in the international climate had taken place. Improvements in East-West relations had eradicated the political and ideological bases for the cold war; the INF Treaty, an agreement to eliminate an entire class of missiles, had been signed and implemented; a strategic arms reduction treaty (START) should be signed shortly, a development which his country welcomed because its important political message would strengthen the NPT by demonstrating that important nuclear-weapon States were moving towards one of its most significant objectives. Progress had also been achieved in conventional disarmament; the successful conclusion of the negotiations in Vienna would contribute towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

The improvement in international relations might, however, mask a dangerous paradox. The spectacular developments in East-West relations seemed to suggest that the risk of global nuclear confrontation was diminishing. The negotiations which had taken place had resulted in reducing vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the realistic possibility of serious reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons held by the super-Powers was offset by the prospect of increases in the number of nuclear-weapon States. Horizontal proliferation was all too likely to have become a reality. The arguments which had made the negotiation of the Treaty a priority more than 20 years previously had lost none of their relevance. In first raising the issue before the General Assembly in 1958, the Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Frank Aiken, had stressed the destructive potential of nuclear weapons and had expressed the belief that a single resort to those weapons could destroy the whole of mankind. Those concerns remained relevant even in the present considerably improved international situation.

True, the worst fears of the Treaty's authors had not been realized: the number of acknowledged nuclear-weapon States had not changed since the signature of the Treaty in July 1968. But the fact that certain States

continued actively to seek nuclear-weapons capability ran counter to the Treaty's objectives. Moreover, the activities of those "latent proliferators" made the balance achieved in the field of nuclear-weapons control a precarious one and placed at risk the safety of the present-day world and of future generations. The competition for military nuclear capability was a constant underlying challenge to non-proliferation efforts.

The Treaty, which represented the keystone of efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons, had come of age. It was a complex agreement which provided a framework for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Fourth Review Conference must demonstrate realism and imagination to match the new role the Treaty was expected to play in the 1990s and beyond.

Prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be a major foreign policy objective of all States parties. During Ireland's presidency of the European Community, the Twelve had formulated a declaration on nuclear non-proliferation demonstrating their irreducible commitment to that objective. The declaration, issued at Dublin on 26 June 1990, was the first ever on the subject by the 12 Heads of State or Government of the European Community. It illustrated the high priority given to the issue by all the Community's member States and should encourage other States, both parties and non-parties to the NPT, to strengthen the non-proliferation régime.

With 141 States parties, the Treaty was the most widely-supported arms control agreement in history. However, some significant States still remained outside the Treaty. In order to be effective, the Treaty must be universal. A truly universal non-proliferation régime was the best guarantee of peace and stability throughout the world.

The Fourth Review Conference was a pivotal one. Since the question of prolongation of the Treaty was to be considered in 1995, an assessment that was both realistic and visionary was called for in 1990. The Conference faced a Herculean task. First, it should aim at strengthening the non-proliferation régime of which the NPT was the cornerstone. Secondly, it should encourage non-party States to accede to the Treaty. Thirdly, it should demand from all States parties full compliance with the terms of the Treaty. "Good faith" was a key term in that context: negotiations on nuclear disarmament must be pursued in good faith and non-nuclear-weapon States must, in good faith, comply with all their obligations under the Treaty.

The objectives being thus clearly defined, how could the Conference achieve them? The NPT represented a compromise among differing points of view, and any review must reflect the same spirit of compromise. There was little to be gained by evaluating how each separate article had been fulfilled; rather, the Conference should evaluate the Treaty as a whole in order to learn how to strengthen its implementation as a whole.

The Treaty drew a fundamental distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Like all other non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, Ireland had forgone the right to develop a nuclear weapons capability and considered that the only acceptable level of nuclear weapons was zero. His Government did not believe that nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of a State. The nuclear-weapon States must negotiate reductions of nuclear weapons and eventually their complete elimination. The first step towards the zero option was to stop the development of nuclear weapons, which required an end to nuclear testing.

He therefore called on the nuclear Powers to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. In 1980 and 1985, Ireland had advocated a moratorium on nuclear testing; today, he wished to make the same call with renewed vigour. His Government considered that a halt to tests and the conclusion of a treaty banning them would provide the clearest proof the nuclear-weapon States could offer of their commitment to complete nuclear disarmament and their determination to control the qualitative development of the arms race. In that connection, Ireland welcomed the agreements concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union on the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, as well as the recent re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban within the Conference on Disarmament. Failure to agree on a comprehensive test ban treaty meant that one of the major hopes of non-nuclear-weapon States had not been met. In that regard, Ireland recognized the objectives of the forthcoming negotiations on the amendment of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and hoped that the Conference would lead to a commitment by all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

His Government took the view that a lack of credible or effective security assurances could only serve to undermine the Treaty. While recognizing that there could be no satisfactory solution to the problem, it felt that negative security assurances would be better than none at all. His

delegation looked forward to a debate on the question at the present Conference. It considered that the process of strengthening the non-proliferation régime must include the exploration of new security initiatives which would reduce the need to acquire nuclear weapons and would contribute towards confidence-building between States.

While the NPT was first and foremost aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it also provided for access for all parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. His Government upheld the right of every State party to the Treaty to develop research and to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Ireland had no plans to develop a nuclear-generating capacity, but since half of the world's nuclear reactors and a number of fuel-cycle facilities were located nearby, it was inescapably affected by nuclear safety issues.

According to the Brundtland report, nuclear power generation was justifiable only if there were solid solutions to the currently unsolved problems to which it gave rise. Since the previous Review Conference, the events at Chernobyl had shown the potential effects of a nuclear accident and demonstrated that radiation recognized no frontiers. Countries with nuclear power programmes should therefore operate those programmes in accordance with the highest possible safety standards and in full consideration of the risks posed to neighbouring States. An international nuclear inspection force to verify those standards would, in his view, be of benefit to both nuclear and non-nuclear States. The principles of international inspection which were already in operation in the context of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could be applied to safety standards. His Government hoped that the Conference would consider that question, which was of the utmost importance.

His delegation welcomed the Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held by IAEA in 1991, which would contribute to the strengthening of international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety.

All co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was based on the safeguards implemented in an exemplary manner by IAEA. Those safeguards were in the direct interest of every party to the Treaty. His Government believed that the civil programme of the nuclear-weapon States should be safeguarded, particularly in the context of an eventual freeze on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. A marginal extension of the Agency's responsibilities would be sufficient for that purpose.

At a time when States were preparing to carry out significant nuclear arms reductions, the question arose of the disposal of the material recovered from nuclear-weapon destruction. His Government hoped that the Conference would explore the Agency's possible role in that area. It should also explore the possible answers to the problems of plutonium storage. Measures should be taken to ensure that any excess of special fissionable materials recovered or produced should be deposited with IAEA. Such an approach could contribute directly to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime by preventing the stockpiling of materials which could be put to direct use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

International nuclear trade must be regulated. There was a need for a legal framework which allowed international trade to flourish while avoiding the risks of nuclear proliferation; such regulation of nuclear export controls would create a climate of confidence between trading partners. The "traditional" nuclear suppliers must promote restraint and encourage emerging nuclear suppliers to accept established nuclear-supply norms. Co-operation in the nuclear field must be conducted in accordance with the strictest non-proliferation standards. His delegation hoped that the Conference would develop the proposal on that question which appeared in the Final Document of the 1985 Review Conference.

His Government looked forward with interest to 1995 as an opportunity to reinforce the Treaty's provision and to renew its commitment to the Treaty for an indefinite period. The decision to be taken in 1995 was not whether to prolong the Treaty but for how long to prolong it. His delegation would welcome an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty by consensus.

The time might not yet be ripe to foresee the nuclear agenda for the next century, but it was not too soon to begin preparations for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. In the view of his Government, a renewed and strengthened Non-Proliferation Treaty was the right vehicle for reaching that objective.

Mr. LEHMAN (United States of America), said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an ever more vital foundation for international stability in that it created conditions for reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons while also creating conditions for co-operation in the field of nuclear technology.

All members of the Preparatory Committee had noted the positive international climate which had emerged since the previous Review Conference and would agree that that general improvement, and particularly the progress achieved in arms control, augured well for the present Conference.

He then read out a statement by President Bush, */ which testified to the importance the United States attached to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the Review Conference.

The Treaty embodied the desire of States parties to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. His Government acknowledged, in particular, the contribution of the Republic of Ireland, whose proposal in the General Assembly had led to the negotiation of the Treaty in the 18-nation Disarmament Conference from 1965 to 1968. The negotiators had been confronted with many uncertainties, and the Treaty, when introduced in the General Assembly and opened for signature on 1 July 1968, had been received with doubts as well as hopes. Yet by the spring of 1970 over 40 States had deposited instruments of ratification and the Treaty had come into force. From the first, many States had considered the NPT a unique means of affirming their commitment to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

Those who questioned the Treaty's value should consider the state of the world today. Tension, confrontation and conflict continued to reign in many regions. The maintenance of international stability was crucial if diplomacy was to have any chance of success. In that context, the Treaty represented a legal barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons, provided mutual assurance of their absence, and reinforced international norms vital to world stability.

Since the end of the Second World War, Europe had been the focus of a prolonged, intense political and military confrontation resulting in what was perhaps the most dense concentration of military forces in history. Today, however, unprecedented changes were taking place, and political relationships within and among countries were being fundamentally restructured. All countries concerned needed assurance that the emerging new environment would not threaten their security. There again, the NPT served as a source of security and stability. His Government was therefore in favour of the

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*/ The full text of the statement will be issued separately.

indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. In the meantime, it was the task of the present Conference to examine in depth the implementation of the Treaty since the previous Review Conference of 1985.

Commenting on the four main results achieved under the Treaty over the past five years, he welcomed, first, the accession of 10 new parties. Those accessions further strengthened the norms of nuclear non-proliferation and co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards.

Secondly, he was pleased to note that during the past five years the Treaty had continued to facilitate access by parties to the many benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The transfer of appropriate technology was essential to the improvement of the quality of life in all countries, including developing ones; IAEA was to be commended for the central role it played in that field. Much nuclear co-operation also related to routine non-power applications in hospitals, farms, industrial enterprises and universities. The past five years had also seen the commissioning of 86 new nuclear power stations. During that period his Government had paid special attention to operational safety, and its assistance to States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy reflected its commitment to preferential treatment of parties to the NPT.

Thirdly, the IAEA safeguards system was the centrepiece of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. Despite a zero-growth budget, the Agency had improved the scope and quality of its inspections. The United States had supported international efforts to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system by making voluntary contributions of over $30 million since 1985. Under a voluntary safeguards agreement which the United States had concluded with IAEA in 1980, the Agency could exercise the right to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in United States facilities, excluding only those immediately involved in national security. More than 230 public and private nuclear facilities were eligible for IAEA safeguards.

The United States continued to urge all nuclear suppliers to require the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards in non-nuclear-weapon States as a condition for significant new nuclear supply. Japan had adopted such a policy in 1989.

The United States continued firmly to support the work of the Exporters Committee, known as the Zangger Committee, set up within the framework of the Treaty, which ensured that nuclear exports were subject to IAEA safeguards.

The United States urged all States parties to the NPT to negotiate safeguards agreements in order to comply with the requirements of article III of the Treaty.

Fourthly, the United States had, over the previous five years, conducted intensive negotiations on a broad range of arms-control issues. The list of agreements and negotiations since the Third Review Conference made it clear that the United States was successfully discharging its responsibilities under article VI of the Treaty. Thus, in 1986, the United States had subscribed to the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In 1987, it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on establishing nuclear-risk reduction centres and had signed the INF Treaty and an agreement on enhancing the norms established by the Biological Weapons Convention. In 1988, it had entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union on advance notification of ballistic-missile launches. In 1989, it had joined in the reaffirmation by the 140 participants in the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons of the need to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the use of chemical weapons and to achieve a universal ban on such weapons. In the same year, it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on prevention of dangerous military activities, an agreement on implementing trial START verification and stability measures and an agreement on advance notification of major strategic exercises and an agreement with other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in CSCE to open negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. In 1990, it had concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles, as well as new verification protocols related to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The United States was currently engaged in bilateral nuclear and space talks with the Soviet Union and in multilateral negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, confidence-building and security measures, and chemical weapons. It was also involved in a number of other discussions at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Many of those agreements and negotiations involved nuclear-weapon States, including the other NPT depositary States, namely, the United Kindom and the Soviet Union. Other

negotiations, such as the 1986 Stockholm Conference, the Conference on Disarmament or the talks on conventional forces in Europe, involved non-nuclear-weapon States as well, for article VI applied to all countries and not merely the nuclear-weapon States.

Stressing the importance of diplomacy in arms control matters, he said that negotiations could progress swiftly at times and slowly at others. Arms-control negotiations involved the most sensitive areas of national security. Progress must be made step by step, and it would be wrong to impose an arbitrary schedule for specific agreements. Only negotiations in good faith offered a chance of rapid progress.

Among notable achievements since the Review Conference of 1985 was the fact that the 23 States members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact were now making progress in their negotiations - covering the area from the Atlantic to the Urals - on conventional forces in Europe. At the Washington Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded a bilateral agreement to destroy the bulk of United States and Soviet chemical weapons by the year 2002. In December 1987, President Reagan and President Gorbachev had signed a historic agreement - the INF Treaty on the elimination of ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear delivery systems. The agreement, which had entered into force in 1988, had already resulted in the elimination of 2,257 Soviet and United States missiles and almost 800 Soviet and United States launchers, and in the introduction of an elaborate system of verification, including innovative forms of on-site inspection.

At their meeting in June 1990, President Bush and President Gorbachev had indicated that an agreement on strategic arms reduction might be signed by the end of the year. For the first time ever, both sides would carry out significant reductions - up to 50 per cent in certain categories - in the numbers of strategic offensive arms. Those reductions would be designed to make a first strike less plausible, providing greater stability and a lower risk of war. Moreover, the far-reaching reductions of the START Treaty would be accompanied by innovative provisions for effective verification and information exchange, thus increasing the confidence essential for a sound strategic relationship. When that goal was attained, the United States and the Soviet Union would continue their talks on nuclear and space weapons.

At the Washington Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union had concluded new verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which should expedite those treaties' ratification. The United States had a step-by-step approach to further nuclear-testing limitations and to a comprehensive test ban as a long-term objective. So long as the United States had to rely upon nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence, a sensible test programme would be necessary to maintain the reliability of those weapons.

The United States welcomed the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

An issue of concern to the Review Conference was that of guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear-weapon States would neither use such weapons nor threaten to use such weapons against them. In that connection, his Government wished to restate its policy, which had remained unchanged under three successive Administrations: "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT or any comparable internationally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack".

The United States was aware of the concern expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT and would continue to participate in discussions on negative security assurances. At the same time, it was convinced that the existing negative security assurances provided adequate security.

A great deal had been accomplished in the past five years but much still remained to be done. The United States was optimistic but not complacent about the future. It was committed to take the necessary steps to ensure a stable and secure world. It also undertook to work towards universal accession to the NPT in view of the dangers in troubled regions of the world which were populated by nations which had not yet acceded to the NPT. The United States hoped that IAEA would receive sufficiently strong support to enable it to continue its effective role both in facilitating peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in the area of safeguards. Responsible export controls by nuclear supplier States were needed. It was also necessary to continue to move forward in arms control, especially in troubled regions where diplomacy was an essential means of resolving conflicts. The NPT was central to each of

those important and, in some cases, urgent tasks, and must continue to play a major role as a framework for peaceful nuclear co-operation and as a vital and irreplaceable instrument of international security.

Mr. de Rivero (Peru) took the Chair.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) read out a message from Mr. Gorbachev, President of the Soviet Union, and requested that the text of the message should be issued as an official document of the Conference. */

The Soviet Union regarded the NPT as the most important multilateral treaty on the basis of which the international régime for the horizontal limitation of nuclear weapons had taken shape and as a major factor for security and stability in a rapidly changing world. Although born during the period of the Cold War, it testified to the international community's political realism and sense of responsibility. The support given by the General Assembly to the Irish initiative in 1958 demonstrated the world community's recognition of the fact that an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States could only increase international tension, undermine the foundations of peace and place additional obstacles in the way of agreements on disarmament. Today, the NPT was one of the supporting structures of the securer world currently being built. The accession of each new State to the Treaty represented a major step towards mutual understanding and co-operation among States and one of the most reliable means of creating a new infrastructure of international relations in line with the civilized world's current level of maturity. The Soviet Union therefore welcomed the representatives of countries which had become fully-fledged parties to the Treaty since the Third Review Conference and, noting the interest shown in the Treaty by countries which had not yet acceded to it, in particular China and France, also welcomed their representatives who were participating in the Conference as observers. An increase in the number of observers was a notable development reflecting an objective trend towards the universalization of the non-proliferation régime.

The period following the Third Review Conference had coincided with revolutionary changes in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, and had been marked by a transition from an era of confrontation between

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*/ The full text of the message will be issued separately.

military blocs to one of co-operation, disarmament and the emergence of control mechanisms designed to ensure security. The world had entered upon a period in which the force of law, humanism and universal values were to enjoy priority over the rule of force. The new political thinking, focused as it was upon the democratization of international relations, had enabled the international community to show that it was capable of taking joint action instead of merely making declarations of intent.

The profound changes which had taken place in the interntional situation had had a direct effect on arms control and disarmament; it would be no exaggeration to say that a reliable peace process, accompanied by a gradual reduction of military potential, had already taken shape. That had been the object of the programme of stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction presented by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986. The most important step towards the implementation of that programme had been achieved with the entry into force of the INF Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, whose main political significance consisted in reversing the absurd logic of nuclear confrontation and destroying the dangerous stereotype according to which the nuclear arms build-up was unavoidable. For the first time, the USSR and the United States had agreed on the elimination of two classes of nuclear missiles and, according to a joint assessment made at the highest level, the implementation of the agreement was proceeding normally. The elimination of short-range missiles had been completed on both sides. As of 1 June 1990, the Soviet Union had, for its part, eliminated a total of more than 1,500 medium-range and shorter-range missiles, or 90 per cent of the original number. The experience of the INF Treaty in other areas of disarmament, and above all nuclear disarmament, especially with regard to verification mechanism, would be extremely valuable to the START agreement at present being negotiated, which was to mark the beginning of major reductions in strategic arsenals measured in hundreds of delivery vehicles and thousands of charges. As soon as possible after the conclusion of the Treaty, the two countries would hold consultations on future negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and on the strengthening of strategic stability.

There was now a real opportunity for radical reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union had already withdrawn 500 nuclear charges stationed in the territory of its allies in 1989 and had refrained from modernizing its tactical nuclear missiles in 1989 or 1990.

At the CSCE in Copenhagen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union had announced further reductions in the number of tactical nuclear missiles in Europe. Those measures were being taken by the Soviet Union unilaterally, without any prior condition. Reciprocal steps by NATO countries and their decision to hold negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe should also be noted.

The Soviet Union favoured a ban on the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials, which should constitute a reliable barrier to both vertical and horizontal proliferation. It had ceased, on a unilateral basis, the production of highly-enriched uranium and had begun to implement a programme of gradual discontinuance of all its industrial reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium by the year 2000. It had also proposed the elaboration of a USSR-United States agreement, as well as a multilateral agreement, on verifiable cessation of production of all weapons-grade fissionable materials, compliance with which could be verified with the help of IAEA's experience. Lastly, the Soviet Union had proposed, at the United Nations, that agreement should be reached on the non-use for military purposes of nuclear material made available as a result of reductions in nuclear arsenals, together with a corresponding verification mechanism.

One of the Soviet Union's priority goals in the field of nuclear disarmament was the achievement of a nuclear test ban at the earliest possible date. From August 1985 to February 1987, the USSR had abided by its unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, on the basis of reciprocity with the United States. Recent substantial reductions in its testing programme provided further proof of its serious intentions in that field and its strict compliance with its obligations under the NPT. Since 1989, it had not conducted any nuclear tests, noting with satisfaction that the United States, too, had curtailed its testing activity, at any rate judging by the first half of 1990. A solution to the problem of nuclear testing would largely depend on practical steps taken in that field by the United States.

The signing at the Washington Summit of protocols to the Threshold Treaties of 1974 and 1976 now made it possible to ratify those treaties and pave the way for setting further limits on nuclear tests with a view eventually to stopping them altogether. The Soviet Union favoured the continuance, without delay, of full-scale negotations in that field, in accordance with the agreement reached in 1987. However, the nuclear-testing

issue called for multilateral efforts in parallel with bilateral efforts, and the Soviet Union therefore consistently advocated that practical work on a test ban should be started, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1987, together with other States, it had submitted draft basic provisions of a treaty on the comprehensive and universal prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. One of the options in that respect would be to extend the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water to cover underground testing. The forthcoming conference on that question should make a positive contribution to the search for a solution to the problem of a nuclear test ban.

Work on agreements aimed at reducing and eliminating nuclear arsenals should be accompanied by the strengthening of guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons, an objective for which the changes taking place in the world situation provided more favourable opportunities.

The Soviet Union reaffirmed its security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Its military doctrine was wholly defensive and it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. It continued to be prepared to seek a mutually acceptable formula, which could then be included in an international legal instrument, setting forth the nuclear Powers' undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against States not possessing such weapons and not having them on their territory. The possibility of the nuclear Powers' unifying their unilateral guarantees in that field could also be studied.

His delegation supported, in principle, the Nigerian initiative on strengthening "negative" security guarantees.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world contributed towards enhanced regional and universal security and reduced the geographical area of nuclear preparations, thus strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime. The Soviet Union had actively supported the efforts made in that direction, particularly in connection with the creation of nuclear-free zones in Latin America and the South Pacific. De facto nuclear-free zones had also been declared in the Antarctic and in outer space, and some individual States had also opted for the denuclearization of their territory, a decision welcomed by the international community. The Soviet Union favoured the establishment of nuclear-free zones in subregions of Europe and in the Mediterranean and the Baltic, as well as in the Middle East,

Africa, South-East Asia, the Korean peninsula and other regions. It undertook to continue to comply with article VII of the NPT, in particular by providing appropriate guarantees to participants in future agreements on nuclear-free zones.

In the area of non-nuclear disarmament, too, there had been a number of positive developments since the Third Review Conference. A USSR-United States agreement on the non-production of chemical weapons and reductions by more than 80 per cent in stockpiles of such weapons had been signed, and a draft Convention on their complete prohibition was taking shape. An agreement on major reductions in conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe was expected before the end of the year.

The settlement and prevention of regional conflicts called for a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, in order to create a barrier to the dangerous spread of all types of weapons. Disarmament processes must be globalized and international relations demilitarized, all countries - including developing ones - being actively involved in efforts to reduce military arsenals and build confidence; all categories of weapons must be covered by the negotiations.

The fact that the threat of nuclear terrorism had today become a reality made it urgently necessary to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, extend the number of parties to that Convention and enhance the effectiveness of its control mechanisms.

The control activities of IAEA were a major element in preserving and strengthening the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In accordance with article III of the Treaty, the Soviet Union provided nuclear materials and equipment to non-nuclear-weapon States only on condition that they applied the IAEA safeguards. Together with other supplier States, it participated in specifying and updating the list of nuclear materials and equipment whose export required application of those safeguards, and strictly complied with that list. It supported the proposals for the introduction by major nuclear-supplier States of a requirement whereby IAEA safeguards should be applied to all peaceful nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty importing nuclear items.

As stated in the USSR-United States declaration on non-proliferation adopted at the Washington Summit, all States parties to the NPT should strictly fulfil their undertakings under the Treaty concerning IAEA

safeguards. The effectiveness and authority of IAEA as a guarantor of the NPT should be given continued support. The Soviet Union, for its part, was ready to make a new contribution to that vital activity.

During the period between the Third and Fourth Review Conferences, the USSR had extended the list of peaceful nuclear installations open for IAEA inspection, in particular by including a fast neutron reactor. The voluntary placing of peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA control by nuclear-weapon States was acquiring special significance; as a gesture of goodwill, the Soviet Union was prepared to increase significantly the list of its nuclear installations placed under IAEA safeguards. All Soviet nuclear power stations and an additional number of research reactors had thus been included in the list which would be officially submitted to the IAEA General Conference in September 1990. That major initiative created an incentive for nuclear-weapon States to place all their peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards and to establish an accounting system with the Agency to cover all nuclear material used for such activities.

Secondly, it was important to continue improving the IAEA safeguards mechanism in order to ensure compliance by States with their obligations under the Treaty. To that end, the Soviet Union had paid over 7 million roubles to IAEA between 1986 and 1989 to support safeguards activities, and in particular to finance scientific research by IAEA. It intended to allocate 5 million roubles in national currency for the period 1991-1992 to finance the IAEA safeguards support programme.

Thirdly, the non-proliferation régime represented an unprecedented complex of international confidence-building measures, contributing towards greater international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Soviet Union had learnt a lesson from the Chernobyl disaster, which had revealed mankind's vulnerability to the destructive force of the atom; it attached vital importance to everything relating to the safety of nuclear power plants. The most important area of international co-operation under IAEA auspices was ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy production. Four years after the event, the consequences of Chernobyl remained so grave that the Soviet Union could not be humanly expected to cope with them alone. Thanks were due to IAEA for the assistance it had provided. The Soviet Union, for its part, was resolved to participate in the international search for optimum methods of using the potential of nuclear energy.

It regarded as inalienable the right of all States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to participate on an equitable basis and without discrimination in international co-operation in that field. It had accordingly made a significant contribution to the development of such co-operation at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, in particular within the framework of IAEA. The Soviet Union's efforts were specifically concentrated on co-operation with East European countries with a view to ensuring the safe development of nuclear energy production and enhancing the reliability of electric power supply, while reducing the use of fossil fuels and protecting the environment.

The USSR was consistenty increasing its voluntary contributions to IAEA's Technical Assistance Fund and also made large deliveries of equipment, instruments and materials to the Agency. It had recently decided to allocate for the period from 1991-1994, in addition to its main contribution, an additional sum of 2 million roubles in national currency to the Technical Assistance Fund for the purpose of implementing assistance projects for developing States parties to the NPT. It supported the idea of creating a system of guaranteed nuclear supplies on the basis of principles currently being developed within the appropriate IAEA committee, taking into account the recommendations of the Third Review Conference, and also favoured the granting of a preferential régime to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty in obtaining equipment, material and information in the nuclear sphere.

Fourthly, with a view to maintaining a high level of international co-operation in the non-proliferation field, the USSR was prepared to continue bilateral and multilateral negotiations and consultations on the strengthening of the Treaty in order to make it universal. It valued its reputation as a reliable partner in co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and complied strictly with all its commitments in that area. Legislation on nuclear activity was at present being developed in the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Parliament was shortly to enact a comprehensive law on nuclear energy uses and nuclear safety, which would play an important role in the new structure of the State ruled by law now in the process of being established.

The political context of the Fourth Review Conference was very different from that of previous Conferences. The present stage of international development offered mankind a real prospect of guaranteed survival without the

threat of mutual annihilation. The opportunity to enter upon a peaceful period founded on international law and order was historic. But the creation of such a world called for the defence of the principles of civilized relations between States in all regions of the world and for a new quality of international security structures.

The NPT was an indispensable means of achieving a new world order and must be strengthened as a common heritage. Its potential, far from having been fully tapped, was increasing in the post-confrontation era. The Treaty was in the interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear States. Only a comprehensive agreement on the non-restoration of nuclear weapons following their complete and final elimination from the life of mankind could replace it in the future. For that reason the USSR called for the convening of a single conference in 1995 covering both the review of the operation of the NPT during the period 1990-1995 and the issue of its prolongation. The present Review Conference was called upon to confirm the value of the Treaty as an effective peacemaking mechanism of modern times.

His delegation, for its part, was willing to co-operate constructively with all parties to the Treaty with a view to finding solutions to the important tasks before the Conference.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland) said that the recent historic upheavals in his country had given rise to far-reaching political, economic and social changes in the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The new political situation that had resulted had revived the disarmament process and should make it possible to end the division of Europe once and for all by strengthening security and co-operation. That was also the prime objective of Polish foreign policy, in order to make Europe a genuine bastion of peace which would contribute to world prosperity.

Poland remained one of the unfailing supporters of the NPT, which it considered to be the crucial element of the non-proliferation régime and the cornerstone not only of its own national security but also of peace in Europe and throughout the world. Like all the countries that had participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, it hoped that the NPT would continue to have a positive influence in the European context while remaining one of the pillars of world security.

Recent progress in the area of disarmament, the radical improvement in the international situation and the interest of the States parties to the NPT in the area of security and development should make it possible to strengthen

the Treaty further during the present Conference, following a constructive examination of all the problems raised by its implementation. The search for common solutions should result in meaningful recommendations on the methods by which the NPT would become genuinely universal and strengthen the common resolve of all countries to make it the pillar of world security and stability beyond 1995. Poland, for its part, saw the continued operation of the NPT as vital and would make every effort to contribute to the achievement of that objective.

The first steps taken in the area of nuclear disarmament with the implementation of the Treaty concluded between the United States and the USSR on intermediate-range nuclear forces, together with the progress made in the START talks, demonstrated the desire of the two super-Powers to meet their obligations under article VI of the NPT and gave reason to hope for substantial reductions in their strategic nuclear-weapons arsenals. But the world expected more from the implementation of that crucial article for the viability of the Treaty. Those signs of progress should be only a beginning, and considerable efforts were still needed in order to attain the desired tangible results. Certain urgent problems still needed to be resolved, in particular in the area of a ban on nuclear testing, testing which could only be conducive to the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arsenals in violation of the spirit of the NPT. Although the limited measures adopted by the United States and the USSR to reduce their testing were welcome, they still fell short of the long-standing expectation of the international community that nuclear testing should be brought to a complete halt, which was a fundamental measure aimed at ending the nuclear arms race. It was therefore to be hoped that with the improvement in their relationships, the two major nuclear Powers, followed by other countries, would soon take meaningful steps towards that goal. The Conference on Disarmament should be called upon to play a role in that undertaking, with additional constructive support from the conference currently being prepared on the review of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty.

The accession of 11 more States to the NPT since the previous Review Conference further enhanced the importance of the Treaty as the arms control agreement with the greatest number of adherents, and extended its operation to areas that were vital for international security. It was to be hoped that the

many States that had sent observers to the present Conference would subsequently decide to accede to the NPT. The presence of representatives of China and France, two nuclear Powers, was particularly important in that respect.

Other positive developments were the high-level political support given to the strengthening of the NPT non-proliferation régime and the IAEA safeguards system resulting from the Washington Summit between the United States and the USSR and that of the 12 European countries in Dublin.

Nevertheless, there were still causes for concern. Certain States, including some with nuclear capability, had not yet acceded to the non-proliferation régime. Today more than ever, the risk that they might gain possession of nuclear weapons must be eliminated, for the spread of such weapons to new States would destroy current prospects for nuclear disarmament, especially in view of the growing danger of the proliferation of missile-manufacturing technology. There was therefore an urgent need to strengthen the NPT among the States of the Middle East, southern Asia, southern Africa and the Americas. The current situation in some of those regions was dangerous for world stability and peace.

The Conference should provide an opportunity to persuade the major nuclear Powers, whose disagreements now seemed to be over, to combine their efforts in order to set up effective barriers against all risks of nuclear proliferation. As to the non-nuclear-weapon States, it was essential to give them security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The draft agreement submitted by Nigeria and the suggestions made by other delegations, notably that of Egypt, might serve as a basis for considering that question and making pertinent recommendations for further action - by the Conference on Disarmament, for example - in order to reach a long-awaited solution.

With its safeguards system, IAEA was continuing a very useful job which his country fully supported. In particular, it welcomed the fact that in its 1989 safeguards implementation report, the Agency had not detected any case of diversion of safeguarded nuclear material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or for any other military purpose. It was also a matter of satisfaction that of the States parties to the NPT that conducted nuclear activities, all but one had accepted full-scope safeguards. Poland made an urgent appeal to that State rapidly to conclude a long overdue safeguards agreement with IAEA.

One should not, however, be misled by encouraging statistics. While 95 per cent of all fissionable material and nuclear installations in the non-nuclear-weapon States were under IAEA safeguards, the remaining 5 per cent were not subject to IAEA inspection, notably in India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, States with developed nuclear installations and all non-parties to the Treaty. That could not but be a source of concern.

His Government greatly appreciated the efforts made by the Director-General of IAEA to explore with the Governments of the Middle Eastern States the possibilities of applying Agency safeguards to all nuclear installations in the region. That would contribute substantially not only to the consolidation of the non-proliferation régime, but also to the peaceful settlement of conflicts in that extremely vulnerable region.

In view of the importance of the IAEA safeguards system, it was essential for the entire international community, and in particular the States parties to the Treaty, to extend to the Agency their full support, both political and economic, given the growing complexity of the problems involved in implementing that system.

Compliance with the provisions of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty was of the greatest importance in safeguarding the principle of non-proliferation. For that reason, his Government expressed its concern at the increase in transfers of nuclear material, technologies and equipment without safeguards to States that were not parties to the NPT. It welcomed the appeals by the international community for strict controls on all such exports. The strict application of the safeguards would also facilitate international co-operation in the peaceful use of atomic energy.

With regard to article IV of the Treaty, his Government wished to pay a tribute to IAEA for its activities to promote co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and noted with satisfaction that, during the past five years, the Agency had substantially increased its technical co-operation with the developing States parties to the Treaty. Of course, technical assistance and co-operation could be increased still further, especially within the framework of bilateral or regional agreements, particularly in Europe, and peaceful co-operation in the nuclear field could be stepped up for the benefit of all States parties to the Treaty, but there

was now no doubt that the Treaty had stood the test of time and that its implementation had made an inestimable contribution to the maintenance of international peace, security and stability.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) noted with satisfaction that the trend at the end of the twentieth century was for the continuation of the disarmament process begun in 1988, when the two super-Powers had agreed to eliminate their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and that there were encouraging prospects for the rapid signing of an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning a 30-50 per cent reduction in their respective strategic arsenals. There was no doubt that the vigorous activity in that area was the result of international détente, but it also reflected the effectiveness of the non-proliferation Treaty, whose existence had in the past two decades played an essential role in maintaining international security and stability. In that respect, the Conference had played an essential role in the past by providing participants in the arms race with an opportunity to meet and hold discussions at a time when East-West tension had created a diplomatic vacuum and the risks of nuclear war had been growing considerably, forcing the non-nuclear-weapon States to remind the nuclear Powers of their obligations under the Treaty. Now, the spectacular improvement in relations between the two major nuclear Powers, the easing of tensions between the two military alliances and the structural changes in Eastern Europe bore witness to the arrival of a new era characterized by the replacement of confrontation by dialogue and by the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the settlement of numerous regional conflicts. Furthermore, the Fourth Conference was taking place at a critical stage, since it was the last one before the 1995 Conference, which would be called upon to decide whether the Treaty should be extended.

By promptly signing the Treaty on 1 July 1968, his country had demonstrated its conviction that that international instrument was likely to strengthen international security and promote multilateral co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had also demonstrated its trust in the nuclear-weapon States which had, as a matter of urgency, pledged to begin negotiations on ending the arms race. More than 20 years later, his delegation noted that the implementation of the Treaty had on the whole been positive, but it shared the concern of the rest of the non-aligned countries as to the occasionally discriminatory exercise of the rights and obligations

of the States parties and would like to see a stronger commitment by the nuclear Powers to the international principle of non-proliferation and international co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It also hoped that détente and the strengthening of confidence-building measures would lead all countries, and particularly the two nuclear Powers that were not yet members, to accede to the Treaty and make it genuinely universal.

He welcomed the fact that the three depositary Powers had on various occasions declared that they had met the obligations deriving from article I of the Treaty, the latest declaration having been the joint declaration made by the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1990, in which the two countries had reaffirmed their commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such declarations, like those of the other States parties that were pledging to continue to respect the Treaty, were most encouraging.

The IAEA safeguards system formed the basis of the international principle of non-proliferation. In that connection, the information supplied by the Agency indicating that it had concluded safeguards agreements with 82 non-nuclear-weapon States was particularly encouraging, as was the fact that no case of diversion of nuclear material or misuse of nuclear installations for military purposes had been reported.

Although there were grounds for satisfaction with the responsible attitude of most States, the international community could not but be concerned when it learned that one of the States parties had allegedly refused to allow one of its installations to be covered by the IAEA safeguards system. That refusal would set a dangerous precedent, in particular for the non-nuclear-weapon States. China's decision voluntarily to allow some of its installations to be covered by the IAEA safeguards system constituted an important landmark for it meant that the Agency had now concluded agreements with all the nuclear-weapon States, including those that were not parties to the Treaty.

Article IV on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was of crucial importance for the developing countries, in particular with regard to agriculture, industry, prospecting for mineral resources, energy, medicine and research. In that connection, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be entitled to preferential treatment, in conformity with the provisions of article V. Such co-operation among all States parties was all the more vital because the first Conference for the Promotion of

International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy had not fully met expectations. It was also important to ensure adequate protection of nuclear installations, not only against military attacks, but also against the consequences of the accidental or deliberate release of radioactive material, as had happened at Chernobyl. The negotiations undertaken in that area within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament should thus be continued and stepped up.

With regard to article VI, his delegation welcomed the progress made in that area by the two super-Powers and the continuation of the negotiations begun with a view to reducing their strategic arsenals by 30-50 per cent. Nevertheless, the new order of international security and peace would not be ushered in as long as the other three nuclear Powers remained outside the disarmament process. Co-operation in that area was all the more necessary because the two military alliances considered themselves no longer to be antagonists but partners in the setting-up of a new security system based on co-operation and dialogue, as proven by the progress made at the latest international conferences. In that connection, his delegation earnestly hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, re-established with the Conference on Disarmament, would benefit from the United States-USSR bilateral negotiations.

Concerning article VII of the Treaty, it would be recalled that as far back as 1974 his country had associated itself with the other African countries in freely and unilaterally renouncing nuclear weapons in Africa; however, that continent was now facing the nuclear threat posed by South Africa. It was to be hoped that the far-reaching changes that had occurred in that country would lead to a change in the South African Government's position in that respect and would result in South Africa's acceding to the Treaty, submitting its nuclear installations to the IAEA safeguards system and pledging to respect the denuclearization of Africa. In that connection, his delegation regretted that the consensus in the United Nations on the denuclearization of the Middle East was being thwarted by Israeli opposition. The nuclear Powers that bore particular responsibility for maintaining international peace and security must urge Israel to accede to the Treaty, and the Conference should give due attention to Egypt's recent initiative aimed at making that part of the world an area free of any weapon

of mass destruction. The unreserved support for that proposal expressed by the countries of the region was a considerable advantage that should be used for the benefit of all peoples seeking peace and stability.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) read out a statement addressed to the Conference by Mr. Alberto Fujimori, the President of the Republic of Peru. */

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS (agenda item 6) (continued)

The PRESIDENT announced the following candidatures for the posts of Vice-President: for the Group of Eastern European and other States: Bulgaria, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Romania and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; for the Group of Western European and other States: Canada, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, United Kingdom and United States of America. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved those candidatures.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN announced that Mr. Jan Chandoga (Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) and Mrs. Tallawy (Egypt) were candidates for the vice-chairmanship of Main Committee III, and that Mr. Plamen Grozdanov (Bulgaria) and Mr. Kongsiri (Thailand) were candidates for the vice-chairmanship of the Credentials Committee. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference approved those candidatures.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT said that, in accordance with rule 44, paragraph 2, of the rules of procedure, Zimbabwe had requested the Secretary-General of the Conference to grant it observer status. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference agreed to that request.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

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*/ The full text of the statement will be issued separately.